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Introduction
Our need to understand the world, and our place
in it, drives both philosophy and science. But to
what extent is our world intelligible? According to
the Principle of Sufficient Reason (“PSR”),
everything is—at least in principle—intelligible.
Everything has an explanation, even if that expla-
nation may not be accessible to us. While the
Principle of Sufficient Reason was not known by
that label until the seventeenth century, the prin-
ciple’s provenance goes at least as far back as
Parmenides, and discussions that exploit the prin-
ciple are to be found in medieval philosophers like
Aquinas, Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides.
But the principle takes center stage in the early
modern era. It is in this period that we find direct
engagement with the PSR. A first task of this entry
will thus be to bring to the fore the nature of the
early modern commitment to this principle, and
the arguments for and against it. A second task
will be to highlight how historical discussions of
the PSR have shaped—and continue to shape—
contemporary philosophy.
This entry will proceed as follows. In the next
section, “Proponents,” I discuss the views, as well
as some arguments, developed by three early
modern PSR proponents: Spinoza, Leibniz, and
du Châtelet. The following section, “Contempo-
rary Proponents,” examines a few contemporary
arguments for the PSR. Lastly, the section on “The
PSR in Contemporary Debates” discusses some




Spinoza is both one of the earliest and also one of
the most thoroughgoing early modern proponents
of the PSR. While Spinoza’s philosophy is both
radical and original, the nature of his commitment
to the PSR involves both Cartesian elements as
well as a commitment to elements of Medieval
Jewish rationalism. Spinoza hints at the influence
of the latter in his Ethics, where, in his discussion
of parallelism, he says:
Some of the Hebrews seem to have seen this, as if
through a cloud, when they maintained that God,
God’s intellect, and the things understood by him
are one and the same. (Ethics 2p7s; all references to
Spinoza’s Ethics are from Spinoza 1994. The first
numeral in references to Spinoza’s Ethics refers to
parts. The letter ‘p’ refers to proposition, ‘c’ refers
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to corollary, ‘d’ refers to demonstration, and ‘s’
refers to scholium.)
According to Seeskin (2018, p. 48), there is
“near universal agreement” that this passage
refers to Maimonides’s monism. For Spinoza, a
commitment to monism is in part entailed by a
commitment to the PSR. However, the extent to
which Spinoza was influenced by Medieval
Jewish rationalism should not be overstated, for
Spinoza departs radically from Judeo-Christian
orthodoxy. For Spinoza, God is not a transcendent
creator of the universe, but an infinite being, and
the universe’s many beings and entities exist as
modes of this infinite being (Ethics 1p15).
The PSR is not explicitly stated in the axioms
of Spinoza’s Ethics. Nevertheless, Spinoza’s com-
mitment to the PSR is arguably implicit in the
statement of his axioms (see Lin 2017). When
Spinoza explicitly formulates the PSR, he does
so in terms of “cause” or “reason”:
For each thing there must be assigned a cause,
or reason [causa seu ratio], both for its existence
and for its nonexistence (Ethics Ip11d2).
The disjunctive “cause or reason” is puzzling.
Are “cause” and “reason” equivalent in meaning
for Spinoza? Or are they distinct (perhaps over-
lapping) notions? For Spinoza, causation involves
a conceptual connection (see Ethics Iax4, Ip6c2).
For all x and y, x causes y if and only if there is a
conceptual connection between the concept of
x and the concept of y (see Della Rocca 2008;
Lin 2017). A causal fact then is then a conceptual
fact for Spinoza. Moreover, for Spinoza, a con-
ceptual connection is explanatory (cf. Ethics Iax5,
IIp5, IIp7s). Thus, effects are conceived or under-
stood through their causes, i.e., a conceptual grasp
of an effect requires a conceptual grasp of its
cause (cf. Ethics Id3). Thus, it would seem that
for Spinoza, a cause just is, or is very much like, a
reason.
Given that for Spinoza causation is a concep-
tual, explanatory relation, what formal features
does it have? For Spinoza, causation is necessitat-
ing and arguably irreflexive. Causation is neces-
sitating just if it is governed by the following
principle: if a causes b, then necessarily, if
a obtains then b obtains. Given this principle, it
follows that if a causes b, then if a necessarily
obtains then b necessarily obtains. Spinoza clearly
espouses the principle in question:
From a given determinate cause the effect follows
necessarily; and conversely, it there is no determi-
nate cause, it is impossible for an effect to follow
(Ethics Ia3).
This feature of causation plays an important
role in Spinoza’s necessitarianism, the view that
“[I]n nature there is nothing contingent, but all
things have been determined from the necessity
of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect
in a certain way” (Ethics Ip29). For Spinoza, there
is only one substance, God (Ethics Ip14), God
exists necessarily (Ethics Ip7d), and everything
is caused by God (Ethics Ip25-26, Ip28d). Given
that causation is necessitating for Spinoza, it fol-
lows that if God causes everything, then every-
thing is necessary. It is worth noting, however,
that there is some disagreement in Spinoza schol-
arship over whether Spinoza is really committed
to a full-blown necessitarianism (see especially
Curley and Walski (1999); for a reply to them,
see Garrett (2018)).
Is causation irreflexive for Spinoza? While
Spinoza appears to endorse a notion of self-
causation (causa sui), it is unclear whether self-
causation involves a violation of irreflexivity. At
Ethics Id1 Spinoza construes a “cause of itself” as
“that whose essence involves existence, or that
whose nature cannot be conceived except as
existing.” This suggests that God’s existence is
explained by God’s essence. Put in terms of
facts, the claim seems to be that the fact that God
exists is explained by the fact that it is essential to
God that he exists. Absent further assumptions—
such as the assumption that God’s essence is iden-
tical to God—this does not constitute a violation
of irreflexivity (at Ethics Ip20 Spinoza says that
God’s existence and God’s essence are “one and
the same,” but see Silverman (2017) for an argu-
ment for the claim that the “one and the same”
relation in Spinoza should not be understood as
one of identity). What might then explain the fact
that it is essential to God that he exists? It may be
that for Spinoza this fact is not apt for explanation.
At Ethics Ip7 Spinoza says: “It pertains to the
nature of a substance to exist.” Della Rocca
(2008, p. 49) argues that Spinoza’s claim here is
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that “each substance is such that its existence
somehow follows from its very concept or
nature.” If we then further ask why substances
are such that their existence follows from their
very concept or nature, the answer might just be:
“that’s just what a substance is.” It is unclear,
given his commitment to the PSR, whether
Spinoza is permitted to simply assume that there
is such an existence-involving concept or nature.
How broad is Spinoza’s PSR? Does it, for
example, apply to only things, or only to facts
about existence, or does it apply to any fact what-
soever? Daniel Garber has charged that Spinoza’s
PSR is explicitly about the explanation of things,
rather than facts, which suggests that Spinoza’s
PSR has narrower scope than a PSR that concerns
facts (see Garber (2015)). It suggests, for exam-
ple, that while each thing (e.g., a red ball) has an
explanation, facts concerning the ways those
things are (e.g., the fact that the ball is red) do
not. In response to Garber’s charge, Michael Della
Rocca has argued that even if we distinguish facts
and things (a distinction which, according to Della
Rocca, Spinoza might not permit), on Spinoza’s
view, a PSR that applies to things collapses into
a PSR that applies to facts. For Spinoza, that there
is an unexplained fact entails that there is an
unexplained state of substance. And if Spinoza
considers a state of substance to be a thing
(which Della Rocca argues he does), then every
time we have an unexplained fact we also have an
unexplained thing. Hence, if there is no
unexplained thing (as per a PSR that applies to
things), there can be no unexplained fact (cf. Della
Rocca (2015)). If Della Rocca is right, then Spi-
noza is committed to an unrestricted PSR on
which no fact or thing is unexplained. Whether
Spinoza’s philosophy lives up to the standards set
by his own unrestricted PSR is another matter. But
putting aside the question of whether Spinoza’s
own philosophy is internally consistent, we will
later see how Spinozistic thought has shaped cen-
tral debates in contemporary metaphysics.
Leibniz
Leibniz, also a trenchant proponent of the PSR, is
credited for the label “Principle of Sufficient
Reason” (cf. Melamed and Lin 2016). Leibniz
formulates the PSR in several distinct ways: as
the claim that nothing happens without reason
(NE 179, AG 31); as the claim that nothing
happens without a cause (AG 31, G. VII. 309);
as the claim that every fact or true assertion has a
sufficient reason for why it is thus and not
otherwise (AG 217); as the claim that nothing
happens without a sufficient reason that
determines why it is so and not otherwise
(AG 210); as the claim that “a reason must be
given” for every truth (G. VII. 309); and as the
claim that every truth has an a priori proof (G. VII.
309). These formulations differ in logical form
(some are contrastive; others are not), in what
they take to be the explanandum (some take the
explanandum to be an event; others take it to be a
fact or truth), and in what they take to be the
explanans or sufficient reason (some take it to be
a cause, others a reason, and at least one takes it to
be an a priori proof).
One might be tempted to treat these various
formulations as distinct principles. But at least one
passage suggests that we should treat them as
versions of the same principle:
There are two first principles of all reasonings, the
principle of contradiction. . .and the principle that a
reason must be given, i.e. that every true proposi-
tion, which is not known per se, has an a priori
proof, or that a reason can be given for every
truth, or, as is commonly said, that nothing happens
without a cause. (G. VII. 309; this passage dates
from around 1686, and is from an essay entitled
“Specimen inventorum de admirandis naturae
Generalis arcanis” (“A specimen of discoveries
of marvelous secrets of a general nature”).)
In this passage Leibniz seems to equate three
seemingly different kinds of explanans: having an
a priori proof, having a reason, and having a
cause. (Frankel (1986) also cites the passage at
G. VII. 309 in support of her view that Leibniz
treats the various versions of the PSR as versions
of a single principle.)
Unlike Spinoza, who treats the PSR as an
axiom and provides no explicit argument for
why we should be committed to it, Leibniz pre-
sents at least three arguments for the PSR. Leibniz
presents his first argument for the PSR in an early
piece written between 1671 and 1672. This piece
is called Demontratio Propositionum Primarum
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(“Demonstration of Primary Propositions”) in the
Akademie edition. (The argument also occurs in
The Philosopher’s Confession (AVI, iii, 118) and
in Leibniz’s last letter to Clarke (Letter V, §18/ LC
60).) Leibniz claims that the sufficient reason for a
thing’s existence is just the totality of its
necessary conditions, or requisites. Since a thing
cannot exist without the requisites for its existence
obtaining, anything that exists has a sufficient
reason for its existence. In Primary Truths, Leib-
niz presents an argument for the PSR from his
conceptual containment theory of truth.
According to this argument, the PSR is entailed
by the conceptual containment theory of truth.
Leibniz says the following in his July 1686 letter
to Arnauld:
[I]n every true affirmative proposition, whether
necessary or contingent, universal or particular,
the notion of the predicate is in some way included
in that of the subject. Predicatum inest subjecto,
otherwise I do not know what truth is. . .For there
must always be some foundation for the connection
between the terms of a proposition, and this must be
found in their concepts. This is my great principle,
with which I believe all philosophers should agree,
and one of whose corollaries is the commonly held
axiom that nothing happens without a reason which
can always be given, why the thing has happened as
it did rather than in another way, even though this
reason often inclines without necessitating (Leibniz
(1969): 337).
On the conceptual containment theory of truth,
what makes each true proposition true is the fact
that the proposition’s predicate is contained in its
subject. This containment of predicate in subject
is explicit in the case of identities (such as “A is
A”), but needs to be shown through the analysis of
concepts in the case of nonidentities (such as “A is
B”). The sufficient reason for each proposition is
an a priori demonstration that reduces the propo-
sition to an identity, and it consists in substituting
the terms of a proposition with definitions until we
(or God) arrive at an identity. Since an a priori
proof is for Leibniz a proof that exploits concep-
tual relations, a sufficient reason for Leibniz con-
sists in such conceptual relations. This brings
Leibniz’s conception of sufficient reason close to
Spinoza’s conception. In his fifth letter to Clarke,
Leibniz gives an inductive argument for the PSR
(LC, L5.129). But earlier in the same letter
Leibniz also suggests that the PSR is not apt for
proof (LC, L5.125). By contrast, Christian Wolff
and Alexander Baumgarten, who were followers
of Leibniz in Germany, thought it necessary to
provide an argument for the PSR, and sought to
derive the principle from the Principle of Contra-
diction (cf. Look 2011).
Like Spinoza, Leibniz is committed to the view
that explanation is necessitating. Moreover,
Leibniz’s conceptual containment theory of truth
entails that all truths are analytic, and so neces-
sary. But unlike Spinoza, Leibniz balks at the
necessitarian conclusion that Spinoza seemingly
embraces. Whether Leibniz really succeeds in
avoiding that necessitarian conclusion is a matter
of some debate. See Adams (1994) for a nuanced
discussion of the evolution of Leibniz’s position
on contingency and necessitarianism.
Finally, it is unclear whether Leibniz is com-
mitted to a violation of irreflexivity. On Leibniz’s
view, the necessary being (i.e., God), carries “the
reason of its existence with itself” (“Principles of
Nature and Grace, Based on Reason” §8/AG 210).
Like with Spinoza, this claim may be construed as
follows: God’s existence is explained by God’s
essence, which is contained within God. Leibniz
is thus not obviously committed to a violation of
irreflexivity.
Du Châtelet
Emilie du Châtelet’s thoroughgoing commitment
to the PSR is most evident in her 1740 text Insti-
tutions de physique (The Foundations of Physics).
In this work—a text which is ostensibly a text-
book for her son—du Châtelet seeks to provide
the metaphysical foundations for Newtonian
physics (see Detlefsen 2014; Brading 2019). In
her preface to this important text, du Châtelet
writes:
In the first chapters I explain to you the principal
opinions of M. Leibniz on metaphysics; I have
drawn them from the works of the celebrated
Wolff, of whom you have heard me speak so
much with one of his disciples, who was for some
time in my household, and who sometimes made
abstracts for me (du Châtelet (1740): XII).
But despite du Châtelet’s own claims to be
expounding Leibnizian metaphysics, there are
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significant ways in which both her understanding
of the PSR and her metaphysics diverge from
Leibnizian (or Leibniz’s) metaphysics. Like
Leibniz, du Châtelet introduces the PSR as a
fundamental principle on par with the Principle
of Contradiction:
The principle on which all contingent truths
depend, and which is neither less fundamental nor
less universal than that of contradiction, is the prin-
ciple of sufficient reason. All men naturally follow
it; for no one decides to do one thing rather than
another without a sufficient reason that shows that
this thing is preferable to the other (du Châtelet
(1740): §8).
This superficial similarity with Leibniz not-
withstanding, du Châtelet’s discussion of the
PSR is noticeably anthropocentric. For her, a suf-
ficient reason is a reason that satisfies us, and that
which makes us understand:
When asking someone to account for his actions,
we persist with our own questions until we obtain a
reason that satisfies us, and in all cases we feel that
we cannot force our mind to accept something with-
out a sufficient reason, that is to say, without a
reason that makes us understand why this thing is
what it is, rather than something completely differ-
ent (du Châtelet (1740): §8, emphasis added).
But a reason that satisfies us need not be the
sufficient reason for the existing of a thing or the
obtaining of a fact in Leibniz’s sense. Indeed, the
standard for what satisfies us might be much lower
than the standard for an ultimate explanation.
Suppose you want to know why the sky is blue.
Plausibly, an explanation in terms of light
scattered by molecules in the earth’s atmosphere
would satisfy you. But such a reason would not
qualify as a sufficient reason for Leibniz, for
whom a sufficient reason is an ultimate explana-
tion, and is to be found only in God (see, for
example, “On the Ultimate Origination of
Things”/AG 149). Indeed, du Châtelet (unlike
Leibniz and a fortiori, Spinoza) thinks that a con-
tingent state of affairs can provide the sufficient
reason for another contingent state of affairs:
The different states of a simple being depend on one
another, for, such a successive state being no more
necessary than another, there must be a sufficient
reason why such a state is actual, and why, rather in
such a time than in any other. Now, this reason can
only be found in the preceding state, and the reason
for that will be in the state antecedent to it, and so on
back to the first (du Châtelet (1740): §129).
Du Châtelet’s conception of a sufficient reason
also seems to make what qualifies as a sufficient
reason contingent on human psychology: the kind
of reason that might satisfy at one time need not
the be the reason that satisfies us at another time.
By contrast, what qualifies as a sufficient reason
for Leibniz does not depend on human psychol-
ogy. For Leibniz, a sufficient reason is a reason
that an “all-knower” might be able to provide:
So far we have just spoken as simple physicists;
now we must rise to metaphysics, by making use
of the great principle, little used, commonly, that
nothing takes place without sufficient reason, that
is, that nothing happens without it being possible
for someone who knows enough things to give a
sufficient reason to determine why it is so and not
otherwise (‘Principles of Nature and Grace, Based
on Reason’ §7/AG 209-210, underline emphasis
added).
For Leibniz, a sufficient reason need not satisfy
us, and may even be inaccessible to us (see, for
example, Monadology §31-32/AG 217). Amijee
(2020) argues that this difference between
Leibniz’s and du Châtelet’s conceptions of suffi-
cient reason underlies their very different meta-
physical views. She shows, for example, that this
difference ultimately explains why Leibniz rejects
inter-substantial causation, while du Châtelet
embraces it.
Contemporary Proponents
There are few contemporary philosophers
who defend the truth of the PSR (as opposed to
philosophers who examine the nature and role of
the PSR in the history of philosophy). This
small group includes Della Rocca (2010, 2020),
Pruss (2006), and Amijee (2017). Dasgupta
(2016) also develops (though does not endorse)
a version of the PSR. Of these contemporary
discussants, Dasgupta (2016), Amijee (2017),
and Della Rocca (2020) explicitly discuss a PSR
formulated in terms of metaphysical explanation
(or grounding, which some of these thinkers take
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to be equivalent to, or at least coextensive with,
metaphysical explanation). (See Fine (2001) for a
representative discussion of grounding.) The
versions of the PSR defended by Pruss (2006)
and Della Rocca (2010) do not explicitly appeal
to metaphysical explanation, but can nevertheless
be understood in those terms. But what is meta-
physical explanation? Roughly, it is the kind of
explanation that tells us what makes it the case
that a fact obtains. Consider the fact that objects
persist over time. In virtue of what do they persist?
According to a four-dimensional perdurantist, an
object persists over time in virtue of the fact that it
is a collection of temporal stages, and the fact that
a temporal stage of the object at time t1 is appro-
priately related to the temporal stage of that object
at time t2 (cf. Lewis 1986; Sider 2001). If this
four-dimensionalist view is correct, these facts
metaphysically explain our original fact by being
those in virtue of which the original fact obtains.
Metaphysical explanation has taken center stage
in contemporary metaphysics. But the notion is
hardly new to philosophy. The kind of explanation
it is intended to pick out (the kind whose presence
is often signaled by the locutions “in virtue of” or
“because”) is both familiar and ubiquitous.
A central question I wish to address in the
present section is this: Does a PSR formulated in
terms of metaphysical explanation or grounding
preserve the strength of the early modern rational-
ist’s PSR? At least one way of measuring the
strength of a PSR is by its consequences. Does
it, for example, entail necessitarianism or the exis-
tence of God? For instance, Pruss (2006) restricts
his PSR to contingent truths, but insists that it still
entails the existence of a necessary being. Another
way to measure the strength of a PSR is by
whether it trivializes intuitively substantive
questions.
The version of the PSR developed by Dasgupta
(2016) purports to avoid at least some of the
formidable consequences that the PSR is tradi-
tionally taken to entail, but seems to trivialize
certain substantive questions that fall under the
scope of the traditional rationalist PSR. Because
grounding sequences, on Dasgupta’s view, termi-
nate in “autonomous” facts—facts that are not apt
for grounding—Dasgupta’s version of the PSR
does not entail the existence of God. No fact
needs to be ultimately grounded or metaphysi-
cally explained by a fact about the existence of
God. Nevertheless, the paradigmatic example of
an autonomous fact on Dasgupta’s view is an
essentialist fact: a fact of the form it is essential
to x that p. And such facts are generally taken to
be necessary. Hence, given that Dasgupta
endorses necessitation (the principle that if
a grounds b, then necessarily if a obtains then
b obtains), and despite his protestations that a
kind of contingency is nevertheless preserved on
the view he develops, Dasgupta’s version of the
PSR entails necessitarianism.
Dasgupta’s PSR—along with perhaps any ver-
sion of the PSR formulated in terms of ground-
ing—seems to trivialize the question “why is there
something rather than nothing?.” On the contem-
porary grounding framework, that there is any-
thing is an existentially quantified fact explained
by its instances, i.e., facts of the form x exists. But
surely, this is not the kind of answer that we are
after when we ask “why is there something rather
than nothing?.” This kind of concern suggests that
perhaps the early modern rationalists did not con-
strue sufficient reason in the way we construe
ground or metaphysical explanation. Perhaps suf-
ficient reason for them is more akin (at least in this
respect) to our contemporary notion of causal
explanation: it seems misguided to answer the
question “what caused there to be something?”
by saying “the table,” where the table is one of
the existing things. Alternatively, perhaps the fact
that the standard view of how existentially quan-
tified facts are grounded or metaphysically
explained makes certain substantive questions
trivial suggests that we ought to revise our
grounding framework.
Unlike Dasgupta (2016), who develops a view
on which a ground-theoretic PSR might be true
but does not argue for it, Della Rocca (2010) pro-
vides an argument for the PSR. Della Rocca
observes that there are uncontroversial examples
of facts for which it is appropriate to demand an
explanation. He argues that we frequently appeal
to “explicability arguments”—arguments for the
nonobtaining of certain states of affairs on the
basis that such states of affairs would be
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inexplicable. For instance, if we place equal
weights on either side of a scale, we infer that
one side will not hang down (assuming there are
no defects in the scale). If one side were to hang
down past the other, we would have an inexplica-
ble state of affairs. Likewise, why think that nei-
ther lefty nor righty—fission offshoots in Parfit’s
(1984) thought experiment—are identical to the
original person? Because the obtaining of the state
of affairs in which the original person was identi-
cal to lefty rather than righty (or vice versa) would
be inexplicable.
Della Rocca argues that accepting some
explicability arguments puts pressure on one to
accept an explicability argument concerning exis-
tence facts (facts of the form such-and-such state
of affairs exists or obtains). But if all existence
facts demand explanation, the PSR is true. Since
explicability arguments seem appropriate in many
cases, those who deny the PSR must provide a
principled reason for why they are not appropriate
in the case of existence facts. Della Rocca sug-
gests that the challenge to provide such a princi-
pled reason cannot be met by opponents of the
PSR. This sort of argument aims to shift the bur-
den of proof from proponents of the PSR over to
those who reject it.
It is not obvious which, if any, of the PSR’s
usual formidable consequences are shared by
Della Rocca’s PSR (though Della Rocca (2010)
seems willing to endorse necessitarianism). And
how would a world in which Della Rocca’s PSR is
true be structured? Would all facts be ultimately
explained by God, or by some other self-
explaining entity, or by autonomous facts (as per
Dasgupta), or would we have to embrace an infi-
nitely descending explanatory regress? Nonethe-
less, the world as conceived by Della Rocca
(2010) certainly has explanatory structure. His
recent work defends a more radical position.
Della Rocca (2020) argues that a particular kind
of Bradleyan explanatory demand with respect to
the obtaining of relations entails a radical monism
according to which there are no distinctions what-
soever. There are thus neither many things nor one
thing—there is simply being. Such a view appears
to entail that the world lacks structure, thus ren-
dering moot the question of how a world in which
the PSR is true would be structured. Della Rocca
further argues that the explanatory demand with
respect to the obtaining of relations—and the fail-
ure to satisfy it—also commits us to an
unrestricted PSR.
Amijee (2017) provides an argument for a
commitment to the PSR—formulated in terms of
metaphysical explanation—rather than for the
principle’s truth. Any argument for the truth of
the PSR is also an argument for a commitment to
it, on the assumption that we ought to be commit-
ted to what is true. However, an argument for a
commitment to the PSR need not be an argument
for its truth. Amijee shows that a familiar species
of inquiry—“structural inquiry”—requires that
those who participate in the practice seek meta-
physical explanations for facts (where the domain
of potential inquiry includes every fact). She then
shows that participating in structural inquiry com-
mits one to the PSR in two different ways: (1) it
leads to the result that every fact is such that one is
committed to its having a metaphysical explana-
tion and (2) it leads to the result that one is com-
mitted to the claim that every fact has a
metaphysical explanation. Finally, she shows
that we ought to participate in structural inquiry,
and so ought to be committed to the PSR.
Amijee’s argument echoes, at least in some
respects, a strand in Kant’s discussion of the
PSR, in the Critique of Pure Reason. Just as
Kant (1998) argues that the PSR is the ground of
possible experience (see especially B/246/A201),
Amijee treats a commitment to the PSR as a
condition for the possibility of structural inquiry.
Amijee’s argument leaves open what explana-
tory structure a world in which the PSR is true
might have. Indeed, she argues that the PSR can
be satisfied by a world containing nonterminating
explanatory sequences. Moreover, it does not fol-
low that we ought to be committed to the PSR
holding in worlds other than our own.
The PSR in Contemporary Debates
Intelligibility
For Spinoza, sufficient reason is intimately
connected with intelligibility and understanding.
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As Della Rocca (2008) writes, for Spinoza, “to
conceive of a thing is to explain it.” Also, as
mentioned earlier, for Spinoza effects are under-
stood or conceived through their causes. This
suggests that for Spinoza, grasp of the explanans
suffices for grasp of the explanandum. Put differ-
ently (and perhaps more strongly), the
explanandum can be deduced a priori from the
explanans. This type of view is perhaps not
entirely alien in the contemporary grounding/
metaphysical explanation framework. Fine
(2012), for example, treats grounding as a relation
akin to logical consequence. If grounding is like
logical consequence, then it is not implausible to
think that the explanandum can be deduced a
priori from the explanans. However, most discus-
sions of grounding or metaphysical explanation
stop short of a commitment to the a priori
deducibility of the explanandum from the
explanans (though the explanans must, in some
sense, illuminate why the explanandum obtains).
Does taking seriously the link between expla-
nation and intelligibility (as Spinoza does) affect
contemporary theorizing about metaphysical
explanation? It turns out that how closely we
relate explanation to intelligibility inevitably
affects our views about what must figure in the
explanans for a given thing or fact.
Della Rocca (2020) argues that it is in the
nature of relations to be grounded in one or more
of their relata. He further claims that because
relations are by their nature grounded in one or
more of their relata, they depend not only on their
relata, but also on the grounding relation that
obtains between the relation and the relevant
relata. While Della Rocca does not draw an
explicit connection to Spinoza here, the intuitive
plausibility of the view he puts forward stems
from construing grounding (and metaphysical
explanation) in the way that Spinoza thought of
sufficient reason—as a reason that makes its
explanandum intelligible. Compare: In order to
grasp what makes it the case that p, it would not
be enough to simply grasp its ground. One would
need to grasp the ground as a ground for the fact
that p. This suggests that in order to grasp what
makes it the case that p, one must not only grasp
its ground, but also grasp the relationship between
the ground and the grounded (i.e., the fact that p).
Construing grounding as very tightly connected to
intelligibility thus informs views about what
ought to figure in a full ground or metaphysical
explanation for a fact.
Likewise, if we eschew the Spinozist link
between the ground and grounded and settle for
something weaker, we in turn end up with fewer
constraints on what must figure in a full ground.
For instance, Amijee (2021) argues that the fact it
is raining at 3 pm on July 31, 2019 can fully
ground the fact that it is raining now (on the
assumption that it is now 3 pm on July
31, 2019). Absent further premises, there is no
way to deduce the explanandum from the
explanans in this case, though the explanans nev-
ertheless illuminates why it is raining now (i.e., it
tells us what makes it the case that it is raining
now).
Reality Without Distinctions
What implications does taking the PSR seriously
have for contemporary metaphysics outside
debates over the nature of metaphysical explana-
tion? As mentioned earlier, Della Rocca (2020)
contends that the PSR entails that there are no
distinctions. He argues that any distinction
invokes a relation, but that relations (and rela-
tional facts)—on pain of explanatory circularity
or a vicious regress—introduce brute facts into
our metaphysical systems. Della Rocca’s monism
has radical consequences. It ultimately entails the
demise of metaphysical explanation itself, for
explanation is itself a relational notion.
If Della Rocca is right, then most of our ordi-
nary presuppositions are false. There is not really
a keyboard that Sakina is typing on that is distinct
from the other objects that surround her, and there
is not really a Sakina that is distinct from you. But
it sure seems to us like there are distinctions out in
the world. What then accounts for the fact (if it is a
fact) that we are suffering from amassive illusion?
In response, Della Rocca might reject the ques-
tion’s presupposition. He might argue that the
question itself relies on a distinction between
how things are and how they seem to us—a dis-
tinction that his view rejects (along with every
other distinction). But if the question has a false
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presupposition, then surely there is a distinction
between what is being falsely presupposed and
what is the case. Thus, it is not clear that Della
Rocca can endorse the suggested reply. More gen-
erally, it appears that Della Rocca’s view prevents
him from drawing a distinction between what is
false and what is true; it is thus—at least on its
own terms—unfalsifiable. Whether this
unfalsifiability is ultimately a virtue or a vice
goes beyond the scope of this entry. What is
undeniable is that Della Rocca has shown us the
extraordinary power of a PSR-driven, Spinozistic
line of argument. And as Della Rocca (2015,
p. 533) himself writes, “Spinoza’s philosophy
can help us to learn or re-learn how to do philos-
ophy in a more productive vein.”
Fundamentality
Perhaps a central motivation for the widespread
contemporary dismissal of the PSR is a commit-
ment to fundamental entities. Many contemporary
philosophers take there to be metaphysically fun-
damental entities (where “entity” is construed
broadly so as to include facts, objects, properties,
etc.). These metaphysically fundamental entities
are explanatorily basic in the hierarchical struc-
ture of reality, and do important theoretical works.
On some views, for example, they are taken to fix
a direction for explanation (i.e., fix whether expla-
nation proceeds “upwards”’ or “downwards”) and
determine facts about relative fundamentality
(Wilson 2016). But on a prominent way of under-
standing metaphysical fundamentality, the funda-
mental entities are just the ungrounded or
unexplained entities (cf. Schaffer (2009)). The
contemporary PSR, however, is the thesis that
everything has a metaphysical explanation.
Thus, at least on the face of it, no PSR proponent
can accept that there are fundamental entities.
This would be a major cost, if true, since funda-
mental entities do important theoretical works
within contemporary metaphysics.
Is there a way to consistently endorse both the
PSR and the existence of some fundamental enti-
ties? Amijee (2017) develops one way. Call rela-
tivist a conception of fundamentality on which
whether an entity (object, property, or fact) is
fundamental is relative to a metaphysical mode
of explanation, where metaphysical modes of
explanation are individuated by which metaphys-
ical dependence relations they involve. By con-
trast, call absolutist a conception of metaphysical
fundamentality on which whether an entity is
fundamental is not relative to a metaphysical
mode of explanation. Most extant views about
the metaphysically fundamental presuppose the
absolutist conception. Yet on this conception, a
commitment to the existence of fundamental enti-
ties that are unexplained precludes a commitment
to the PSR. By contrast, on the relativist concep-
tion, an entity may be unexplained, and thus fun-
damental, relative to one metaphysical mode of
explanation, and yet remain explained relative to
another metaphysical mode of explanation. If the
PSR requires only that every entity be such that it
is explained relative to somemetaphysical mode of
explanation, a relativist conception permits us to
endorse both the PSR and fundamental entities.
Amijee (2017) argues on independent grounds
against an absolutist conception of fundamentality,
and in favor of a relativist conception.
A central goal of this entry has been to high-
light the nature of the early modern rationalist
commitment to the PSR, and to bring out the
extent to which contemporary treatments of the
PSR owe a substantial debt to this history. Readers
will hopefully have gained a sense not only of the
PSR’s influential history, but also its continued
relevance as a fundamental metaphysical thesis.
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